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INTRODUCTION
The public classroom presents a unique set of First Amendment
concerns.  There, the teacher, a government employee, speaks to an
audience comprised solely of students.  Despite the concerns that flow
from this particular speaker-audience dynamic, the Supreme Court
has stated that teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”1  However,
courts have long wrestled with—or apparently disregarded—this
† A.B., Dartmouth College, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2015; Articles
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 100. I would like to thank the members of the Cornell
Law Review whose hard work and thoughtful suggestions have benefitted this Note. I also
owe special thanks to my friends and family for their ceaseless love, support, and humor.
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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poetic maxim when confronting the realities of the present day public
classroom and the First Amendment protection that ought to be af-
forded to educators therein.  Indeed, the First Amendment should
not provide an impenetrable shield enabling public educators to vo-
calize any radical idea before their students—especially in light of
their rather unique functions in the worlds of primary, secondary, and
higher education.  However, the nature of teachers’ duties necessarily
implicates their First Amendment rights, which should not be relin-
quished simply because of their status as educators for the state.2
Courts have struggled with the appropriate First Amendment pro-
tection to afford public educators exercising their duties as govern-
ment employees.3  The most recent court to address the issue, the
Ninth Circuit in Demers v. Austin, examined whether a public univer-
sity professor asserted a viable First Amendment retaliation claim fol-
lowing his dismissal after circulating a book to his students that
criticized certain university policies.4  The Ninth Circuit discussed
what has long perplexed courts—the appropriate standard to apply to
determine if the public university professor engaged in speech and
conduct shielded by the First Amendment.5  Although the court ulti-
mately found that the appellant, Demers, did not assert a viable First
Amendment retaliation claim, it applied the more flexible balancing
test that is not endorsed by all sister circuits.6  In doing so, the Demers
court reflected upon the sensitivity of such claims, noting, “Ordinarily,
such a content-based judgment is anathema to the First Amendment.
But in the academic world, such a judgment is both necessary and
appropriate.”7  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
courts should hesitate before making content-based judgments on
speech restrictions an educational institution can impose because
such action may inappropriately convey the idea that courts “know
2 See id. at 506.
3 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that when public
employees speak “pursuant to their official duties,” they are not granted the First Amend-
ment protection of ordinary citizens); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(stressing that a balance must be reached between the interests of public employees to
“comment[ ] upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs”).
4 See Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 407 (9th Cir. 2014).
5 See id. at 406.  Specifically, the court examined the appropriate standard to apply to
academic speech, that pronounced by the Supreme Court in Pickering or in Garcetti. See id.
at 410–12.
6 The court ultimately held that Pickering provides the correct test to apply in
instances concerning academic speech.  The court concluded that “Garcetti does not—in-
deed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot—apply to teaching and academic writ-
ing that are performed pursuant to the official duties of a teacher and professor.” Id. at
412 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 Id. at 413.
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better than the institution itself the nature and strength of [the insti-
tution’s] legitimate interests.”8
The Demers decision highlights the ongoing debate regarding the
appropriate test to apply when determining whether a public educa-
tor’s speech ought to be shielded by the First Amendment.9  Although
this Note will examine the common rationales courts apply when se-
verely restricting public educators’ speech, it will also analyze the issue
through the perspective of cognitive development theory.  This alter-
native perspective assesses the cognitive and moral growth of children
and adolescents, which leads to a more informed analysis of the ap-
propriate standard for First Amendment restrictions in the public
classroom.  For although the teacher’s role in the public classroom
raises distinct First Amendment concerns, analyzing these issues from
the perspective of the student audience assists in determining a stan-
dard that will promote the effectiveness of public education, while
allowing for the flexibility to adequately restrict or protect educators’
classroom speech depending on the circumstances.
I
BACKGROUND
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Demers v. Austin provides the most
recent reflection on the difficulties encountered and confusion ex-
pressed by courts regarding whether public educators’ classroom
speech may receive First Amendment protection.10  Fully appreciating
the complexities of the issues specific to educators’ speech in the pub-
lic classroom requires a background of the relevant Supreme Court
precedent guiding the circuit courts’ decisions in this area of First
Amendment protection, for this ambiguous precedent highlights the
cause for confusion and inconsistent results rendered.11
A. The Emergence of the Pickering Balancing Test
In Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School, the Su-
preme Court held that “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on
issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal
from public employment.”12  The case concerned Pickering, a public
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., id. at 411 (describing the nature of academic speech and how it may not
fall under Garcetti).
10 See id.
11 This Note focuses on the classroom speech of public school teachers and university
professors, and the cases examined in this Part primarily reflect that focus.  However, in
some circumstances, cases pertaining to nonclassroom speech have been included for the
purposes of illustrating the standard applied by circuits that have not confronted the issue
in a classroom-speech context.
12 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
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high school teacher who was dismissed by the district’s board of edu-
cation after writing and publishing a letter in the town newspaper crit-
icizing a proposed education tax increase.13  At Pickering’s board
review of the dismissal, the board stated that the letter contained falsi-
ties that harmed the reputation of the school’s administration, which
would create controversy among teachers, administrators, and the dis-
trict’s residents.14  The Illinois court then reviewed the proceeding to
determine if the board’s findings were supported by factual evidence,
and ultimately rejected Pickering’s claim that the First Amendment
protected the content of his letter.15
However, the Supreme Court discussed that the findings of the
board, which the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, rested on a pre-
mise that the Court had “unequivocally rejected” in prior rulings.16
The Court emphasized that whether the school needed additional
funds, as proponents of the proposed tax increase purported, quali-
fied as “a matter of legitimate public concern,” where teachers would
“most likely . . . have informed and definite opinions,” making it “es-
sential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without
fear of retaliatory dismissal.”17  Additionally, the Court noted that
Pickering’s statements did not impede the “proper performance of his
daily duties in the classroom.”18  Thus, the Court enunciated what has
since been referred to as the “Pickering test,” which courts subse-
quently applied when examining whether the First Amendment ought
to shield a public employer’s speech.  The test requires “arriv[ing] at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.”19  Although the facts of Pickering per-
tained to the education context, courts have applied the Pickering
balancing test as a barometer in measuring First Amendment protec-
tion concerning any public sector employee’s speech.20
The Court subsequently modified the Pickering test in Connick v.
Myers, where it held:
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of
13 Id. at 563, 566–67.
14 Id. at 567.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 568.
17 Id. at 571–72.
18 Id. at 572–73.
19 Id. at 568.
20 See, e.g., Diaz-Bigio v. Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 51–53 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying Pickering
to city officials’ speech); Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 268–69 (2d Cir. 2007) (state
correctional employees); Reuland v. Hynes, 460 F.3d 409, 413–15 (2d Cir. 2006) (district
attorneys).
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personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of
a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction
to the employee’s behavior.21
Connick more clearly defined what constitutes matters of public con-
cern under Pickering,22 but aside from this clarifying effect, it did not
substantively change the already well-established balancing test.23
B. Garcetti -Incited Confusion
Following the Court’s decision in Pickering, courts applied the bal-
ancing test to issues concerning public employees’ speech in a variety
of sectors.24  In relation to education, courts applied the Pickering test
to both classroom and nonclassroom speech, often adding Connick as
an additional factor in the analysis.25  Notably, while courts have long
been reluctant in granting First Amendment protection to educators’
statements, the Pickering balancing test does not indiscriminately strip
educators of First Amendment protection.26
However, confusion among the circuits developed following the
Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, which held that when public
employees “make statements pursuant to their official duties, the em-
ployees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”27  The case involved Ceballos, a deputy district
attorney, who authored a memorandum expressing his concerns
about inaccuracies in an affidavit about a case on the docket.28
Despite Ceballos expressing his belief that the court should dismiss
21 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).  The Court did not mention whether this additional
prong would apply in the analysis of education-related speech.  However, several circuits
have added this additional prong on the traditional Pickering balancing test. See e.g., Evans-
Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 337–38 (6th Cir. 2010); Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of
N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th Cir. 2011); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d
687, 694–95 (4th Cir. 2007).
22 See JoNel Newman, Will Teachers Shed Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse
Gate? The Eleventh Circuit’s Post-Garcetti Jurisprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761, 775–77
(2009) Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48 (“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement
. . . .”).
23 See supra note 21. R
24 See supra note 20. R
25 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 337–38; Adams, 640 F.3d at 560; Lee, 484 F.3d at
693–95.
26 Compare Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Of
great[ ] relevance is that the Supreme Court has never removed in-class speech from its
presumptive place within the ambit of the First Amendment.”), with id. at 235 (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (“The Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment applies to a
teacher’s classroom speech, and there is good reason to think that it would not do so.”).
27 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
28 Id. at 413–14.
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the case, it nonetheless proceeded to trial shortly thereafter.29  Cebal-
los claimed that following a series of contentious communications be-
tween himself and others in the sheriff’s department concerning the
case, he faced retaliation in the workplace, and he ultimately brought
his action to federal district court.30  The district court held that the
First Amendment did not protect the memorandum that Ceballos
authored, while the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed—
finding that the First Amendment shielded the memorandum’s con-
tents.31  In so doing, the Ninth Circuit applied the Pickering balancing
test, finding that the memorandum qualified as a “matter of public
concern,” but did not address whether Ceballos made the statement
in his capacity as a citizen.32  Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit held that
Ceballos’s interest in this speech outweighed his employer’s interests
because his employer neglected to identify any disruptions in the effi-
ciency of the workplace stemming from Ceballos’s memorandum and
the communications in question.33
The Supreme Court, however, took an approach different from
that of the Ninth Circuit. The Court clarified the two prongs of the
Pickering balancing test, which entail first determining whether the
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and sec-
ond, “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justifi-
cation for treating the employee differently from any other member
of the general public.”34  In clarifying the prongs of Pickering, the
Court also acknowledged that a government employer may exercise
discretion in restricting employees’ speech, but such restrictions
“must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the en-
tity’s operations.”35  The Court noted that in the case at hand, Cebal-
los authored the memorandum whilst speaking as an employee
fulfilling his duties.36  The Court introduced a new test, departing
from Pickering, and held that “when public employees make state-
ments pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speak-
ing as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”37
The Court justified this departure from the traditional Pickering analy-
sis by emphasizing that Ceballos authored the memorandum pursuant
to his duties as an employee and that “[r]estricting speech that owes
29 Id. at 414.
30 Id. at 414–15.
31 Id. at 415.
32 Id. at 416 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Circ. 2004)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 418.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 421.
37 Id.
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its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does
not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a pri-
vate citizen.”38
Importantly, however, the Court noted that the Garcetti test may
not necessarily apply in an education context, for “expression related
to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates addi-
tional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for” in that
case at issue.39  Thus, the Court explicitly refrained from deciding
whether the Garcetti holding would apply in an education setting.40  In
his dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized that in an education context,
whether or not a teacher’s speech is made pursuant to job duties
should be immaterial when deciding whether the First Amendment
protects the speech.41  Justice Souter further elaborated upon this
issue and bluntly expressed the concerns the majority briefly
addressed:
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is
spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university
professor, and I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to
imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write
pursuant to official duties.42
Thus, Garcetti left unanswered the pertinent question of whether its
holding would apply to issues concerning education-related speech
and public educators, inducing confusion and uncertainty among the
circuits.
C. Inconsistent Responses to Garcetti
The Garcetti holding has led to inconsistencies and apparent con-
fusion among the circuit courts regarding the appropriate test to ap-
ply in the context of public teachers’ and professors’ classroom
speech.43  This Note will next examine the different approaches taken
by the circuit courts, because fully appreciating the appropriateness of
applying the Pickering balancing test rather than the restrictive Garcetti
test in this context requires examining the circuit courts’ expressed
preferences and rationales for either Garcetti or Pickering.  In some
instances this requires examining education-related speech more
38 Id. at 421–22.
39 Id. at 425.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “it is senseless to let constitutional
protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description”).
42 Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 See, e.g., Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 935 (2d Cir. 2008); Gorum v. Ses-
soms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 333
(6th Cir. 2010).
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broadly, beyond that specific to the classroom, for some circuits have
yet to examine such a scenario after Garcetti.
Despite the reservation of the Supreme Court in Garcetti, the
Third Circuit explicitly endorsed the Garcetti test in the context of ed-
ucation speech by applying it to a scenario in which a tenured profes-
sor brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against his university-
employer following his dismissal.44  He contended that the university
retaliated against him for speaking in support of a student at a discipli-
nary hearing and for objecting to the selection of the university presi-
dent.45  In evaluating the merits of the professor’s claim, the Third
Circuit applied the Garcetti test and found that the professor, while
assisting a student at a disciplinary hearing, did not speak as a citizen
but rather within his “official duty” as a university professor.46  How-
ever, the court made the same acknowledgement as the Garcetti Court
that “scholarship or classroom instruction” may present different con-
stitutional concerns.47  Although the Third Circuit expressed confu-
sion regarding whether Pickering would be preferred to Garcetti in the
classroom context, it nonetheless refrained from considering whether
to apply Pickering in that specific education-related instance.48
Some circuits have transitioned from ambivalence regarding the
appropriate standard to explicit endorsement of Garcetti over Pickering.
The Second Circuit initially refrained from answering the question of
whether Garcetti or Pickering would apply to teachers’ speech,49 but it
has since applied the Garcetti test without discussing the potential rele-
vance of Pickering in its analysis.50  The Seventh Circuit has similarly
favored the Garcetti test after wavering between the appropriate test to
apply in several holdings.51  The court initially expressed that
“[Garcetti] is not directly relevant to our problem,” when examining a
public university instructor’s speech made during class to her stu-
44 See Gorum, 561 F.3d at 183, 185.
45 Id. at 183.
46 Id. at 186–87.
47 Id. at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 Id. at 186, 187 n.6.
49 See Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that in a
case concerning a public teacher’s classroom speech, “[i]t is an open question in this Cir-
cuit whether Garcetti applies to classroom instruction. . . .  But we need not resolve the issue
. . . because [appellant] does not raise this issue on appeal and his claim would fail regard-
less of the standard”).
50 See Massaro v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 481 F. App’x 653, 654–56 (2d Cir. 2012)
(holding that the First Amendment did not protect a public school teacher’s comments
concerning her belief that the classroom was unsanitary because she spoke as an employee
and not as a private citizen).
51 See, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–75 (7th Cir. 2008); Mayer v. Monroe
Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007); Piggee v. Carl Sandburg
Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006).
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dents.52  The Seventh Circuit then evaded the question of which test
to apply in a case concerning the classroom speech of a public school
teacher who advocated her viewpoint on an antiwar demonstration to
her students.53  The court held that “the [F]irst [A]mendment does
not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when conducting the edu-
cation of captive audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints,
that depart from the curriculum adopted by the school system,” again
failing to endorse one test over the other, although applying strin-
gency comparable to that characteristic of Garcetti.54  The Seventh Cir-
cuit later replaced this initial ambivalence with full endorsement of
Garcetti.55  This transition occurred in a case examining whether First
Amendment protection should extend to a public university profes-
sor’s criticism and complaints of the university’s proposed use of grant
funds.56  The court applied Garcetti, determining that the professor
spoke in his capacity as a public employee rather than a private citizen
and therefore was not afforded First Amendment protection.57  The
court refrained from discussing whether Pickering would even apply in
that context.58
While the Second and Seventh Circuits have transitioned from
ambivalence to explicit endorsement of Garcetti,59 examining related
cases in other circuits further reveals the pervasive confusion the two
standards cause.  For instance, several circuits have added Garcetti as
an additional prong on the traditional Pickering analysis—an approach
the Garcetti opinion itself does not suggest.60  The Sixth Circuit ap-
plied Garcetti as an additional prong on the Pickering balancing test,
noting that the potential Garcetti exception would not apply to the
plaintiff, a high school teacher, because “[s]he is not a teacher at a
public college or university and thus falls outside of the group the
[Garcetti] dissent wished to protect.”61  This interpretation of Garcetti
52 Piggee, 464 F.3d at 672 (acknowledging that Garcetti was not directly on point in the
analysis of teaching-related speech but failing to explicitly adopt Pickering).
53 See Mayer, 474 F.3d at 478.
54 Id. at 480.  Notwithstanding the court’s evasion of endorsing either Garcetti or Pick-
ering, the opinion offers insight into the special considerations that are implicated by a
teacher’s speech in the public primary and secondary school setting, given the “fact that
the pupils are a captive audience.” Id. at 479.
55 See Renken, 541 F.3d at 774–75.
56 Id. at 770.
57 Id. at 773–75.
58 See generally id. (no discussion of Pickering).
59 See Massaro v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 481 F. App’x 653, 654 (2d Cir. 2012); Renken,
541 F.3d at 774.
60 See, e.g., Duvall v. Putnam City Sch. Dist., 530 F. App’x 804, 813 (10th Cir. 2013);
Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 333 (6th Cir. 2010); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch.
Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 nn.10–11 (4th Cir. 2007).
61 Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Sixth Cir-
cuit’s opinion regarding the appropriateness of Garcetti under such circumstances over-
looks the Garcetti majority’s unresolved question of whether its holding would apply in an
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effectively eliminates First Amendment protection for the educator-
speaker, albeit under the guise of applying the more flexible Pickering
standard.  In certain instances, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits appear
to have adopted a similar approach by claiming to apply the Pickering
test, justifying this action by noting that the Garcetti Court “explicitly
did not decide” whether that test would apply in teaching-related
speech, but in actuality substantially altering the standard Pickering
balancing.62
However, several circuits have enthusiastically adopted the Picker-
ing test, explicitly rejecting the stifling Garcetti test in the context of
public educators’ speech.63  While the Fourth Circuit previously ap-
plied an altered form of the Pickering test, which evaded the Garcetti
issue, it more recently opted for explicit endorsement of Pickering.
The Fourth Circuit declined to extend Garcetti’s reach in a case con-
cerning a public university professor’s speech—Adams v. Trustees of the
University of North Carolina–Wilmington.64  The court emphasized that
“[t]he plain language of Garcetti . . . explicitly left open the question of
whether its principles apply in the academic genre where issues of
‘scholarship or teaching’ are in play.”65  This “clear reservation”
prompted the Fourth Circuit to apply the Pickering test in areas con-
cerning scholarship and teaching.66  The Ninth Circuit, in its recent
decision in Demers v. Austen, has likewise abandoned the restrictive
Garcetti test in favor of Pickering balancing in this context.67  The court
offered an extensive discussion of the appropriateness of endorsing
education context, as well as Justice Souter’s condemnation of such a practice. See Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006); id. at 427–30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62 Lee, 484 F.3d at 694.  This case concerned a high school teacher who brought a
First Amendment retaliation claim against the school board after he was told to remove the
materials posted on the classroom bulletin board.  Although the court stated it applied
Pickering, the first step in its analysis was determining whether the speech in question was
curricular in nature. Id. at 698.  The court folded this preliminary analysis into the first
prong of the traditional Pickering analysis, stating that “when a First Amendment free
speech dispute involves a teacher-employee who is speaking within the classroom, the de-
termination of whether her speech involves a matter of public concern is dependent on
whether or not the speech is curricular.” Id. at 697.  No other court seems to have inter-
preted Pickering in the same manner, further reflecting the inconsistences between the
circuit courts on this issue. See also Duvall, 530 F. App’x at 813 (applying the “Pickering/
Garcetti” test to determine whether the First Amendment protects a public school special-
education teacher’s speech to her supervisors).
63 See, e.g., Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 407 (9th Cir. 2014); Adams v. Trs. of the
Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 563 (4th Cir. 2011).
64 Adams, 640 F.3d at 563.  This approach can be distinguished from the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s analysis in Lee, 484 F.3d at 694, although the court did not address the rationale
behind its changed analysis. See supra note 62.
65 Adams, 640 F.3d at 563.
66 Id. at 562.
67 See Demers, 746 F.3d at 406.  Although the court noted that Demers’s speech was
made pursuant to his official duties as a university professor, the speech nonetheless fell
within the Garcetti exception. Id. at 410–11.
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Pickering over Garcetti, ultimately concluding that “if applied to teach-
ing and academic writing, Garcetti would directly conflict with the im-
portant First Amendment values previously articulated by the
Supreme Court.”68  Moreover, the court did not limit its holding to
higher education, but did note that “the degree of freedom an in-
structor should have in choosing what and how to teach will vary de-
pending on whether the instructor is a high school teacher or a
university professor.”69
The Demers decision offers a reflective analysis on the appropriate-
ness of the Pickering balancing test and thereby highlights the extreme
differences in the tests and analyses applied by other circuits when
confronting comparable issues.  This Note will assess the appropriate
test to apply when determining whether First Amendment protection
should be afforded to the classroom speech of public school teachers
and public university professors.  First, it will reject the application of
Garcetti because the test effectively eliminates any possibility of the
First Amendment protecting a public educator’s classroom speech.
This Note will then argue that Pickering is the appropriate test to apply,
especially when analyzing the Supreme Court’s expressed concerns
for youthful student audiences, the desire to preserve academic free-
dom in universities, and the insight provided by cognitive theorists
concerning the abilities of children and adolescents at different levels
of education.  Examining this issue through the lens of cognitive and
moral development theory reveals that the Pickering balancing test al-
lows for a more flexible approach to First Amendment protection by
reflecting the content of the speech and the level of the students’ edu-
cation, while also preserving courts’ expressed desires and concerns
regarding public education.  Additionally, this approach accounts for
an important facet thus far ignored by the courts—the cognitive abili-
ties of the audience.
II
REJECTING THE APPLICABILITY OF GARCETTI IN ISSUES OF
EDUCATION-RELATED SPEECH
Notwithstanding the actions of the Second and Seventh Cir-
cuits,70  courts should resist the improper expansion of the Garcetti
68 Id. at 411.  Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit previously applied the confusing stan-
dard endorsed by the Sixth Circuit, adding Garcetti as an additional prong on the tradi-
tional Pickering analysis.  The case involved a public school math teacher who posted
banners in his classroom with patriotic expressions and the word “God,” and the Ninth
Circuit ultimately found the speech to be unprotected by the First Amendment. See John-
son v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2011).
69 Demers, 746 F.3d at 413.
70 See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. Additionally, whether applying R
Garcetti as the sole test or as an additional prong of the Pickering or Pickering-Connick
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holding to issues concerning education-related speech.71  Indeed, the
Garcetti decision has been regarded as one that “may ultimately prove
the death knell for any meaningful First Amendment rights for class-
room related communications made by teachers.”72  In addition to
the Garcetti majority’s express reservation of such an extension, Justice
Souter raises legitimate arguments in his dissent concerning such mis-
applications of the majority’s opinion and the potential adverse effects
of the Garcetti analysis.73  Moreover, criticism of Garcetti ’s application
in the context of education exists at both the primary and secondary
levels74 and in higher education.75  Notably, while the Pickering test
imposes a rather stringent standard for granting First Amendment
protection to an educator’s speech, regardless of whether it pertains
to classroom speech or academic speech in a different setting, it does
not totally eliminate the educator’s path of recourse.76  In contrast,
disregarding the explicit reservation of the Garcetti Court by extending
its holding to the academic context would likely eviscerate any rem-
nants of First Amendment protection for public educators.77  Indeed,
analysis, either approach will create the same result, making either approach equally
inappropriate.
71 See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are
not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurispru-
dence.  We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analy-
sis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving
speech related to scholarship or teaching.
Id. at 425.
The Court’s acknowledgment that teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” implicates these constitutional
concerns.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
72 Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First Amendment
Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37, 62 (2008).
73 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436–38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
74 See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 90 (2012) (“In
the context of secondary schools, Garcetti has been interpreted to deny all academic free-
dom in the classroom because a school system does not regulate teachers’ speech as much
as it hires that speech.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75 Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the Applica-
tion of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 165 (2009)
(“When it comes to pure content-based regulation of scholarship and teaching in a univer-
sity environment, application of Garcetti is . . . problematic.  Research and publication are
undeniably within job responsibilities in the broadest sense.”).
76 See Hutchens, supra note 72, at 62 (acknowledging that recent years have evidenced R
a general judicial resistance to granting First Amendment rights for teachers, but noting
that “courts have not uniformly agreed that teachers do not possess some kind of First
Amendment rights for in-class speech”).
77 Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e think
it beyond possibility for fairminded dispute that the ‘scope and content of [the teacher’s]
job responsibilities’ did not include speaking to his class in his classroom during class
hours.” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424)); Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667,
675 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Classroom or instructional speech, in short, is inevitably speech that
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it is difficult to envision a scenario in which public educators speaking
in their classroom could make statements not “pursuant to their offi-
cial duties,”78 for the speech would not exist without an educator’s
employment as a teacher, whose duties are carried out in the
classroom.
In response to the inappropriate extension of Garcetti, several
scholars have offered alternative approaches to resolve the issue of
determining when educators should be afforded First Amendment
protection for academic speech.79 Although criticism of Garcetti’s ap-
plication to education-related speech exists, the proposed alternatives
fail to substantially consider the impact of such speech on the student
audience.  Thus, the following section argues that the Pickering balanc-
ing test provides courts with a more appropriate framework to deter-
mine whether to grant public educators First Amendment protection
for classroom speech.  The rationale for this proposal rests in recon-
ciling courts’ expressed concerns regarding student audiences and
institutional goals of public education with cognitive and moral devel-
opment theories.
A. Appropriateness of Pickering Balancing in Primary and
Secondary Education
1. Identifying Judicially Recognized Goals of Mandatory Education
and Related Concerns for Public Schools
A key tenant of the Pickering analysis requires determining
whether the speech, which must be on a matter of public concern,
promotes the efficiency of the public services the public entity per-
forms.80  However, the “public service” performed by public education
is neither singular nor easily articulable.  The “public services” and
thus goals of public primary and secondary education include, but are
is part of the instructor’s official duties, even though at the same time the instructor’s
freedom to express her views . . . [is] protected.”).
78 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
79 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 22, at 792 (offering an alternative to Garcetti where the R
First Amendment would protect the teacher’s expression if it did not create a disruption to
the educational process); Emily G. Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach
to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 119, 123 (2008) (arguing that a
sliding-scale approach should be applied).
80 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  For the purposes of this Note,
the speech in question will refer to classroom-based speech, which may be curricular or
noncurricular.  Courts have held that a teacher may not control or dictate his or her curric-
ula, and in such cases there lacks a matter of public concern. See Kirkland v. Northside
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ.,
624 F.3d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he First Amendment does not protect primary and
secondary school teachers’ in-class curricular speech . . . .”).  However, this ideology neces-
sarily does not apply to instances where First Amendment concerns arise from an educator
teaching in a methodology that adheres to the curriculum but nonetheless implicates First
Amendment concerns.
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not limited to, imparting knowledge deemed valuable.81  Indeed, sev-
eral courts have recognized properly educating youth as a rather
straightforward goal of public primary and secondary schools.82 The
very existence of statewide curricula and the pervasiveness of stan-
dardized tests in primary and secondary school are evidence that a
principal purpose of public schools is to impart a baseline level of
knowledge to students.83
Additionally, in the primary and secondary school years, courts
have identified that the purpose of education extends to teaching
moral and societal values.84  Courts have recognized the tension be-
tween enabling a teacher to impart values while also remaining sensi-
tive to the impressionable nature of children given the unique setting
of compulsory education.85  Despite the difficulties this aspect of edu-
cation creates, several scholars have argued that an integral purpose
of lower education is value inculcation and preparing children for en-
tering society.86  Public schools “traditionally have viewed instilling the
young with societal values as a significant part of the schools’ educa-
81 See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code §§ 51210, 51220 (2006) (mandating specific areas of study
for primary and secondary school); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 69, § 1D (2009)(requiring
the Board of Education to establish “standards [that] shall cover grades kindergarten
through twelve and shall clearly set forth the skills, competencies and knowledge expected
to be possessed by all students at the conclusion of individual grades or clusters of
grades”); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 28.001 (West 2014) (declaring that the state Board of
Education “shall require all students to demonstrate the knowledge and skills necessary to
read, write, compute, problem solve, think critically, apply technology, and communicate
across all subject areas”).
82 See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Put simply,
our school systems are responsible for adequately and properly educating our youth.  A
school board carrying out this vital responsibility is entitled to some enhanced control over
expressions within its classrooms . . . .”); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 237
(6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] structured curriculum permits [a] school to advance its educational
mission . . . .”).
83 See Address by Arne Duncan, States Will Lead the Way Toward Reform (June 14,
2009), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/states-will-lead-way-toward-reform.
Former secretary of education Arne Duncan declared that the new standards for schools
must be limited to “the essential knowledge and skills” students need and that “new tests
[must] measure whether students are meeting those standards.” Id.
84 See, e.g., Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 99 (3d Cir. 2009); Coles
ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 377 (6th Cir. 1999).
85 Compare Busch, 567 F.3d at 99 (explaining that in public school “attendance is com-
pulsory and moral and social values are being developed along with basic learning skills,”
and that “[i]n seeking to address that tension, elementary school administrators and teach-
ers should be given latitude within a range of reasonableness related to preserving the
school’s educational goals”), with Coles, 171 F.3d at 377 (explaining that “students are
young, impressionable, and compelled to attend public schools”).
86 See, e.g., Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A
First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 320 (1980) (“[W]e
must not overlook the fact that schools influence the quantity and quality of that debate
both by transmitting values . . . and also by transmitting important skills and
knowledge . . . .”).
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tional mission,”87 and have been regarded as “the cradle of our
democracy.”88
Given the aspirations of public primary and secondary education,
courts not infrequently take the perspective that teachers are simply
hired speakers who convey knowledge the school district prescribes.89
Several courts have acknowledged that teachers’ expression is their
“stock in trade, the commodity [they] sell[ ] to [their] employer in
exchange for a salary.”90  Similarly, it has been acknowledged that the
teacher acts as “a proxy for the School District, and the School District
may choose both how its students are taught and what its students are
taught,” to accomplish the goals prescribed in curricula and im-
parting societal values.91  This opinion that public school teachers
may be regarded as “agent[s] of the state”92 in the context of
mandatory education with clearly defined goals necessarily impacts
the views that courts have of the teacher’s day-to-day role in the
classroom.93
The combined nature of the mandatory primary education sys-
tem, the clear mission of its schools, and the age of its students, cre-
ates a particularly sensitive environment for monitoring teachers’
classroom speech.  Indeed, courts often express the viewpoint that
teachers are merely paid mouthpieces and that “pupils are a captive
audience . . . [and] must ought not be subject to teachers’ idiosyn-
cratic perspectives.”94  The “position of trust and authority” bestowed
upon teachers implicates certain First Amendment worries given their
frequent interaction with “impressionable young minds.”95
87 Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to De-
termine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1343 (1976).
88 Hutchens, supra note 72, at 56 (quoting Alder v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509–10 R
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). See also Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You
Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 76 (2002) (noting the “vital need to create an informed and edu-
cated citizenry in a democratic society, in which the citizens act as the ultimate gover-
nors”); Coles, 171 F.3d at 377 (recognizing that courts too have recognized that “public
schools are particularly important to the maintenance of a democratic, pluralistic society”).
89 See e.g., Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007).
90 Id.; see also Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2011)
(noting that the First Amendment does not protect speech that owes its existence to the
speaker’s employment as a teacher); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 340 (6th
Cir. 2010) (indicating that a school board hires the speech of teachers and thus retains
authority to regulate that speech).
91 Hutchens, supra note 72, at 52–53 (quoting Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, R
523 F.3d 153, 172 (3d Cir. 2008)).
92 Redish & Finnerty, supra note 88, at 82. R
93 Goldstein, supra note 87, at 1297 (“The teacher’s role is to convey these truths R
rather than to create new wisdom.”).
94 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479.
95 Johnson, 658 F.3d at 968; see also Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 695–96
(2007) (acknowledging that because of the special responsibilities of school systems, they
are entitled to “enhanced control over expressions within [their] classrooms, so that [they]
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN107.txt unknown Seq: 16 26-NOV-14 14:50
258 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:243
However, while idealistically the teacher may merely act as a
mouthpiece, strictly adhering to the enumerated goals defined by the
school district, in reality, effective teaching does not lend itself to such
rigidity.  This disjunction misinterprets the profound influence that
teachers have over students when imparting both practical and moral
knowledge.96  While courts do not hesitate to view teachers as paid
speech, scholars have asserted that teachers have a “special task” of
fostering “open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for
responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and
effective public opinion,” which can be achieved only when teachers
themselves act as “exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry.”97
This view of teaching calls into question the rationale that achieving
the goals of mandatory public education necessarily requires greater
classroom speech restrictions.  One must reconcile this view of teach-
ing with the purported notion that young children comprise an im-
pressionable, captive audience, necessitating greater restrictions on
teachers’ speech or—in the case of Garcetti—eliminating any such pro-
tection.  Moreover, courts have yet to address whether this concern
may differ between primary and secondary education—further calling
the rationale into question.  However, analyzing these issues through
the lens of cognitive and moral development theory helps illuminate
and evaluate the validity of these concerns.  This viewpoint reveals the
importance of applying Pickering balancing rather than Garcetti, for the
Pickering test would allow courts to address their expressed concerns
pertaining to this speaker-audience dynamic while also accounting for
the abilities of students at different levels of schooling.
2. Assessing the Validity of These Concerns Under Cognitive and
Moral Development Theory
As previously discussed, courts are faced with the difficult task of
enabling schools to achieve the expressed goals of public education,
which entail imparting both moral values and pertinent knowledge,
while also remaining mindful of the concern that students are a cap-
tive audience.98  However, the legitimacy of this concern ought to be
examined, for it necessarily impacts the appropriate standard to apply
can ‘assure . . . that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropri-
ate for their level of maturity’” (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
271 (1988))).  Such concerns are not merely limited to the confines of the school board in
dictating curricula, but rather become a community concern. See Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d
at 342 (“[P]arents long have demanded that school boards control the curriculum and the
ways of teaching it to their impressionable children.”).
96 See CHANGES IN TEACHERS’ MORAL ROLE: FROM PASSIVE OBSERVERS TO MORAL AND
DEMOCRATIC LEADERS 16 (Dorit Alt & Roni Reingold eds., 2012).
97 Hutchens, supra note 72, at 56–57 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, R
196–97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
98 See supra Part II.A.1.
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regarding First Amendment issues and, ultimately, the amount of pro-
tection teachers should receive for their classroom speech.  When ex-
amining this issue through a perspective grounded in theories of
cognitive and moral development, it becomes apparent that while
such concerns are somewhat legitimate in younger years, as children
progress through several years of schooling these concerns become
less warranted.99  Informing the analysis of First Amendment stan-
dards for public educators’ speech with this perspective reveals that
Pickering provides an appropriate standard that enables schools to
achieve their educational goals without stifling teachers’ speech.
Firstly, the extent to which children are a captive audience may
involve some legitimate concerns that relate to what young students
ought not be exposed to in the classroom.  For instance, one theory of
cognitive development, social learning theory, emphasizes that chil-
dren learn through observation,100 which may create concerns similar
to those identified by courts.101  Under the view of this theory, chil-
dren learn through observing others, models, who ideally are per-
ceived as having prestige and power, such as teachers.102  Children
learn new skills, alter their behavior, and change the frequency of pre-
viously learned behavior through imitating models.103  Moreover, chil-
dren can learn from models academic skills as well as moral values—
the two most strongly expressed goals of public education during the
years of mandatory schooling.104  Additionally, given the empirical
support for this theory, it raises particular concerns that teachers, as
potential adult models, ought to pay particular attention to behaviors
they demonstrate to their students and refrain from modeling inap-
propriate behaviors.105  However, although teachers may serve as
likely models under this theory, in order for children to model their
behavior certain conditions must be met; thus, the teachers’ status
alone does not always mean that children will imitate their behav-
ior.106  Although this theory somewhat aligns with courts’ expressed
99 See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
100 Albert Bandura’s theory of social cognition emphasizes observational learning,
wherein children learn behaviors from others, namely models, whom children observe and
then imitate. R. MURRAY THOMAS, COMPARING THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 150–52
(Michele Sordi ed., 6th ed. 2005).
101 See supra notes 94–95.
102 JEANNE ELLIS ORMROD, HUMAN LEARNING 128 (6th ed. 2012).
103 Id. at 127.
104 Id. at 130–31.
105 Id. at 145–46.
106 See id. at 132–33.  Stating that a teacher’s position of status in the classroom will
unquestionably lead to modeling would oversimplify the complexities of this cognitive
theory.  For a child to model another’s behavior, certain conditions must be satisfied.  Spe-
cifically, the child must attend to the model, retain the observed behavior, reproduce this
behavior, and lastly, be motivated to do so. See generally id. at 133–35 (detailing the require-
ments for effective modeling).
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concern of children being a captive audience, the legitimacy that this
theory provides to these expressed concerns ought not be overstated.
Moreover, this theory does not fully address the captive audience issue
because it fails to describe the progression of cognitive development,
a perspective that helps evaluate whether these concerns remain
throughout all years of education.107
An additional theory of cognitive development that provides in-
sight into the cognitive and moral growth of children, focusing on the
developmental trajectory, further assists in determining whether the
same “captive audience” concerns are warranted in both primary and
secondary education.  Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development
examines the logical reasoning processes children become capable of
at different ages.108  An analysis of cognitive development across the
years of mandatory education becomes crucial in examining what
standard courts should apply and the protection teachers’ classroom
speech ought to receive under the First Amendment, for courts have
conflated the concerns of primary school children with those of sec-
ondary school children.109  Cognitive development theory defines spe-
cific stages that correspond to ages in which children achieve certain
cognitive feats.110  Namely, Piaget marked the ages of approximately
seven- to eleven years as the concrete-operational stage, wherein chil-
dren more rapidly acquire operations, a term used to refer to specific
mental actions, and are capable of thinking more logically about tan-
gible objects.111  At this stage, children also begin to realize that
others do not necessarily share their own perspectives.112  However,
despite the cognitive gains evidenced in this age group, which corre-
spond to the later years of elementary school education, this stage of
cognitive development is also marked by limitations.113  Children at
107 See THOMAS, supra note 100, at 163. R
108 See e.g., ORMROD, supra note 102, at 309.  Bandura’s theory of social cognition, R
which provides empirical and theoretical insight into some of the courts’ voiced concerns,
fails to provide insight into children’s developmental trajectory. See THOMAS, supra note
100, at 163.  On the other hand, Piaget’s theory examines cognitive advances, including R
thinking and perceiving, from infancy through adolescence. See DAVID R. SHAFFER, SOCIAL
AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 51 (6th ed. 2009).  Although the stages discussed in
Piaget’s theory begin in infancy, for purposes of this Note the most relevant stages are
those corresponding with the ages of primary and secondary school students.
109 See, e.g., Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment does not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when con-
ducting the education of captive audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that
depart from the curriculum adopted by the school system.”).
110 See SHAFFER, supra note 108, at 51. R
111 See id. at 52, 60.  Piaget’s theory was constructed around children’s successful com-
pletion of mental tasks at certain ages, which mark progress in cognitive development.
Although the specific ages have received some criticism, they nonetheless represent aver-
age ages at which the cognitive achievements occur and have received empirical support.
112 See ORMROD, supra note 102, at 313. R
113 Id. at 317.
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this age still have difficulty applying logical operations to hypothetical
ideas and abstract concepts—thus sometimes lacking the ability to
“easily distinguish between logic and reality.”114  With this in mind,
perhaps the concerns that courts express concerning primary school
children may apply to children in the age range identified by Piaget’s
formal operational stage, but to a slightly lesser extent.
However, the final stage of cognitive development in Piaget’s
theory, the formal operational stage, is the stage in which children
can consider conditions of problems, develop hypotheses, and con-
sider what may logically occur following certain events.115  Whereas
prior to adolescence, children remain bound to their perceptions of
the real world, they now can understand theories and combine ideas
to solve problems, and their thought processes become more adult-
like in nature.116  This stage not only has practical implications for the
classroom goals of imparting knowledge117 but also for the develop-
ment of personal thoughts.  Adolescents in the formal operational
stage can more readily imagine alternatives to realities, which may
make them more inquisitive.118  This is in contrast to children, who
“tend to accept the world as it is and to heed the dictates of authority
figures.”119  The stark differences in the cognitive capabilities of chil-
dren and adolescents in these two stages strongly suggest that the pri-
mary concern that courts have for enforcing stricter restraints on
teachers’ classroom speech in the years of primary education do not
apply in secondary school.  In adolescence, individuals no longer
readily take as true the messages authority figures convey, thereby
weakening the contention that students are a captive audience that
may be indoctrinated by teachers’ claims that fall outside of a school-
prescribed curriculum.120
Although cognitive development theory has yet to play a role in
the discussion of First Amendment restraints on teachers’ classroom
speech, the theory has nonetheless influenced educational decisions
that affect children.  For instance, awareness of children’s cognitive
deficiencies during certain ages has influenced curriculum sequenc-
ing and guided decisions regarding topic placement for grade
114 Id.
115 See THOMAS supra note 100, at 208. R
116 See id. at 209.
117 See id. at 216–19.
118 See SHAFFER, supra note 108, at 63. R
119 See id. at 63.
120 See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“But if indoctrination is likely, the power should be reposed in [the elected school board]
rather than tenured teachers.”).
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levels.121  However, cognitive development theory also provides a com-
pelling argument that courts have yet to address for applying Pickering
when determining whether a public educator’s speech ought to re-
ceive First Amendment protection. Pickering involves a balancing of
the efficiency of the public service the school provides with the inter-
est of the teacher’s speech122—such balancing could enable courts to
account for the cognitive differences between children in primary and
secondary school, where the abilities of the students are quite differ-
ent.  Additionally, the efficiency of the services the school offers at
differing grade levels would necessarily implicate the effectiveness of a
teacher’s practice in imparting knowledge to students in the appropri-
ate manner.  While the courts express concern for the students being
captive audiences at both primary and secondary schooling levels,123
this rationale is misguided given that the capabilities of students in
these different age groups are distinct.  Especially in the later stages of
cognitive development, which emerge at adolescence, the concerns
that courts have cited for limiting a teacher’s freedom of expression
do not carry as much weight.  Indeed, to promote these cognitive ad-
vances, a “teacher is expected to achieve a proper balance between
actively guiding or directing children’s thinking patterns and provid-
ing opportunities for children to explore by themselves,”124 which cre-
ates the risk that such a practice may conflict with the notion that
teachers’ expression is simply a “stock in trade, the commodity [they]
sell[ ] to [their] employer in exchange for a salary.”125  Teachers
should be able to encourage such exploration and critical thinking in
these years, albeit within the constructs of the school district’s curricu-
lum, without overly fearing First Amendment retaliation.
B. Arguing for Pickering Balancing at the University Level
Just as cognitive development theory and the analysis of institu-
tional goals demonstrate the appropriateness of applying Pickering bal-
ancing at the public primary and secondary levels of education, a
parallel analysis reveals the same in the context of public university
education.  Applying Pickering at the public university level aligns with
preserving academic freedom and accomplishing the institutional
121 See THOMAS, supra note 100, at 217–19.  Specifically, curriculum developers who R
have examined the cognitive skills that children in certain age groups achieve use the
theory to guide the structure of age-appropriate curricula.
122 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
123 See, e.g., Mayer, 474 F.3d at 480.
124 THOMAS, supra note 100, at 220. R
125 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479; see also Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954,
967 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that if the teacher’s speech owes its existence to the speaker
being a teacher, there is no First Amendment protection); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ.,
624 F.3d 332, 340 (6th Cir. 2011) (indicating that a school board can be viewed to have
hired the speech of a teacher).
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goals of higher education—promoting inquiry and furthering devel-
opments in academia.126  As with speech in primary and secondary
education, evaluating the issue through the lens of cognitive and
moral development theory strengthens the argument for applying the
Pickering test to classroom speech of public university professors, for it
allows for more flexibility by examining cognitive and moral capabili-
ties of students of this age group.
1. Examining Institutional Goals and Preserving Academic Freedom
in Higher Education
While courts express concerns about subjecting impressionable
minds at the public primary and secondary levels of education to ma-
terial that deviates from the institution’s prescribed goals,127 these
specific institutional goals are absent in the context of higher educa-
tion.  Rather, the Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged the
value of preserving academic freedom at the university level.128  Aca-
demic freedom has been defined as “a non-legal term referring to the
liberties claimed by professors through professional channels against
administrative or political interference with research, teaching, and
governance.”129  The Supreme Court has held preserving academic
freedom in high regard, emphasizing that “[a]cademic freedom,
though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.”130 Indeed,
the Court has noted that the “government should be extremely reti-
cent to tread” on academic freedom.131
This strong interest in safeguarding academic freedom in univer-
sities closely aligns with courts’ expressed institutional goals of pro-
126 See infra Part II.B.1.
127 See supra Part II.A.1.
128 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1986); Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957).
129 See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99
YALE L.J. 251, 255 (1989).  Byrne argues that academic freedom should be reserved for
rights needed to preserve “the unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of
disinterested scholarship and teaching.” Id. at 262.
130 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
131 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.  Some courts have held that academic freedom applies to
the academic institution, not to the individual professor. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d
401, 411 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that professors do not have academic freedom and that
the “Supreme Court, to the extent that it has constitutionalized a right of academic free-
dom at all, appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in
academic affairs”).  However, the Supreme Court seems to have not refrained from apply-
ing academic freedom principles to individual professors. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12
(emphasizing that “[a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhib-
ited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsis-
tently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself” (citations omitted)).
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moting inquiry and discovery at this level of education.132  In
elaborating upon the importance of preserving academic freedom,
the Supreme Court in Sweezy v. New Hampshire emphasized, “To im-
pose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation . . . . Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.”133  This high regard for academic freedom134
distinguishes the institutional purpose of university education from
that of primary and secondary education.135
The liberal approach of university education, which is based on
questioning truths rather than merely inculcating knowledge in stu-
dents, provides a compelling argument for abandoning the applica-
tion of Garcetti in higher education on this facet alone.  Although the
administration at public universities, like school districts, retains the
authority to prescribe the institution’s curriculum,136 university educa-
tion aims to develop in students the ability to address opposing opin-
ions and to form distinctly individual viewpoints.137  In relating this
interest in preserving academic freedom to First Amendment claims
by educators, Garcetti imposes an additional hurdle on academic free-
dom at the university level.138  While the tension between academic
freedom and the rigidity of the Garcetti test supports discarding the
test for classroom speech at the university level of education, examin-
132 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
133 Id.
134 While the concepts of academic freedom, some argue, should not be limited to
university education, for the purposes of this Note it will be treated as a characteristic that
is unique to the university given the scholarly disagreement and the courts’ failure to in-
form the matter.
135 See McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The pedagogi-
cal missions of public universities and public elementary and high schools are undeniably
different.  While both seek to impart knowledge, the former encourages inquiry and chal-
lenging a priori assumptions whereas the latter prioritizes the inculcation of societal values.
Public universities encourage teachers and students to launch new inquiries into our un-
derstanding of the world.”).
136 See Tepper & White, supra note 75, at 164. R
137 Byrne, supra note 129, at 337. R
[T]ruth is discovered through research and inquiry, that there are no re-
vealed truths or dogmas that are not subject to question through research.
Equally important is the concept that the function of education is to open
the minds of the students, a function best accomplished by bombarding
students with all conceivable ideas, from which they may discern truth, if it
exists, by and for themselves.
Goldstein, supra note 87, at 1342.
138 See Tepper & White, supra note 75, at 165, 171 (addressing that applying Garcetti to R
the university environment is problematic because “[r]esearch and publication are undeni-
ably within job responsibilities in the broadest sense” and “faculty members ordinarily must
conduct research and publish scholarly works . . . [to] further a core function of the uni-
versity: knowledge creation”).
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ing the cognitive and moral development typical of students of this
age bolsters this argument.
2. Aligning the Preservation of Academic Freedom with Cognitive and
Moral Development Theory
Unlike the concerns that courts express in the context of primary
and secondary education, in the context of higher education, courts
aim to preserve academic freedom and promote academic inquiry.139
Just as analyzing cognitive and moral development theory bolstered
the argument for applying Pickering in lower education, it similarly en-
lightens the analysis for higher education.  Of particular relevance, in
the most advanced stage of cognitive development, the formal opera-
tional stage, thinking becomes more abstract and individuals can form
logical hypotheses—an ability that continues to develop throughout
adulthood.140  Moreover, this ability fortifies and becomes more com-
plex through individual experiences.141  This developing logical abil-
ity also corresponds closely to a later stage of moral development—
the autonomous level.142  At this stage, a person “tries to identify uni-
versal moral values that are valid, regardless of what authority or
group subscribes to the values,” thereby developing a personal com-
pass of morality.143  Additionally, research has shown that those who
receive higher education reason more complexly about moral issues,
suggesting that higher education exposes individuals to diverse per-
spectives that further cognitive and moral growth.144  Ultimately,
through exposure to diverse perspectives, individuals begin to define
right and wrong based on their own abstract ethical principles and to
assess the strength of the positions of others.145
The transition of moral development from a rules-based ap-
proach, wherein the individual accepts authoritarian rules and laws, to
one of a more inquisitive nature, supports courts’ strong desire to pro-
mote and preserve academic freedom in public universities.  Universi-
ties aim to encourage inquiry in order to advance the individual’s
139 See supra Part II.B.1.
140 ORMROD, supra note 102, at 317–18 (recognizing that the formal operational stage R
begins at adolescence and abstract thinking develops through this time). See also THOMAS,
supra note 100, at 209. R
141 See THOMAS, supra note 100, at 209.
142 See id. at 432.  The autonomous level of moral development is also referred to as
the postconventional or principled level.  Another relevant feature of this stage of moral
development includes thinking of laws as expressing the majority’s will, but nonetheless
recognizing that laws may unjustly compromise human rights, leading the individual to
challenge them.
143 Id.
144 See SHAFFER, supra note 108, at 355. R
145 See id. at 354–55.
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ability146 to contribute to society as well as for the institution to fur-
ther developments in academia.147  Applying Pickering when address-
ing issues of public university professors’ classroom speech would
encourage both of these missions and promote the cognitive and
moral development of university students themselves.
In examining the elements of Pickering balancing in a university
context, promoting the efficiency of the public university necessarily
requires encouraging the promotion of academic freedom, which can
be achieved by exposing students to different viewpoints.  Professors
must stimulate discussion among students and present a variety of
opinions, which achieves goals at both the individual and institutional
levels by furthering academic inquiry and potentially leading to dis-
coveries that contribute to society.  Although the public university still
retains the power to prescribe the curricula,148 university professors
ought to be given greater latitude when adhering to these curricula by
promoting the primary function of the university itself, forming ideas
that contribute to academia.  Promoting these institutional goals while
simultaneously refraining from imposing overly broad limits on
professors’ speech certainly poses a challenge—but Pickering balanc-
ing allows for such considerations.  On the other hand, Garcetti does
not similarly permit considerations of academic freedom or the insti-
tutional goal of further developing the abilities of students because
any speech made by professors “pursuant to their official duties” will
be devoid of First Amendment protection.149  Thus, the test eviscer-
ates any protection that the First Amendment may grant professors
furthering such academic inquiries within the university classroom,
making Pickering the more appropriate alternative.
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Garcetti, courts have strug-
gled with deciding which standard to apply regarding public educa-
tors’ classroom speech, which has resulted in confusion and
inconsistencies.  The Garcetti Court explicitly reserved the question of
whether its stringent, inflexible standard would apply in the education
context, causing some courts to take this reservation as reason enough
to apply Pickering, while others have disregarded the reservation alto-
gether.150  Some courts have engaged in a thoughtful deliberation on
this issue, most recently in Demers v. Austen, and concluded that Picker-
146 See McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2010).
147 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1986). See supra
note 131.
148 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
149 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
150 See supra Part I.C.
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ing provides the appropriate test.151  However, these discussions neg-
lect an informative perspective in the analysis—the cognitive and
moral development of students across primary, secondary, and higher
education.  Indeed, examining the differences between the institu-
tional goals of primary, secondary, and higher public education and
comparing how these goals are best achieved in light of the cognitive
and moral development of students has yet to influence the decision
regarding which test to apply.  This multidisciplinary approach en-
hances the analysis for several reasons—it allows for an evaluation of
the validity of the courts’ expressed concerns for primary and secon-
dary students as a captive audience and bolsters the claims regarding
universities as encouraging academic freedom.  This insight supports
the appropriateness of adopting the Pickering test, which implicitly al-
lows for consideration of these realities.  Determining whether an ed-
ucator’s speech impairs the efficiency of the public service, being the
school or university, requires assessing how the institution is achieving
its goals in the classroom, which varies depending on the level of edu-
cation and students’ abilities.  Moreover, the Pickering test would still
permit courts to examine the speech in question harshly, as has been
the practice even prior to Garcetti.  However, this novel approach to
the Pickering test would still provide a potential avenue of recourse for
educators who believe that their First Amendment rights have been
violated while performing their duties as public educators within the
classroom.
151 See Demers v. Austen, 746 F.3d 402, 412 (9th Cir. 2014); supra notes 4–10. R
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